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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT:
PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY

An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing that duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others.1

I. INTRODUCTION
While the words of Lord Brougham from Queen Caroline’s Case might
sound unreasonable to most laymen, they reflect a central and longstanding
canon of legal ethics.2 The attorney has a duty to act as a “zealous advocate”
for the client.3 Corporate attorneys,4 however, operate in a slightly different
context. Whereas most attorneys’ loyalties lie solely with their clients, the
corporate attorney must frequently balance the interests of the client against the
interests of the investing public.5 These attorneys often find themselves in the
troubling situation of having to decide what to do when they become aware
that their corporate client has engaged or is engaging in wrongful or fraudulent
conduct.6 Society places responsibilities on corporate and securities lawyers
not faced by most attorneys: to play the role of corporate gatekeeper,7 a role

1. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975) (citing
2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Throughout this comment, references to corporate attorneys, corporate clients, and
corporate actors refer to parties who represent or work for corporations which are publicly traded
and subject to federal securities laws.
5. Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron
Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market
Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 94-95 (2002).
6. Id. at 102-03.
7. “The term ‘gatekeeper’ suggests a guardian with independent professional
responsibilities, including a responsibility for protecting the institution.” SEC Commissioner
Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Orison S. Marden Lecture Before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York (Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111703hjg.htm
[hereinafter Goldschmid Speech]. Corporate gatekeepers are responsible for vouching for the
271
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traditionally associated with corporate accountants and auditors.8 However,
exactly how these attorneys should behave in order to fulfill the dual roles of
corporate gatekeeper and client advocate has frequently been a subject of
debate.9
Recently, this debate has been reignited. Following the revelation of
corporate fraud and misconduct at major corporations such as Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco,10 the federal government attempted to stabilize the
securities markets and bolster investor confidence by passing the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (the “Act”).11 The Act includes civil and criminal
provisions intended to affect the way in which corporate actors approach
reporting financial information, conducting public audits, and compensating
executives and officers.12 However, Congress did not intend to reach only
corporate officers and accountants with this Act. Section 307 of the Act
includes a provision directing the Securities and Exchange Commission13 to
promulgate “standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers.”14
SEC Rule 20515 provides corporate and securities lawyers with greatly
needed guidelines of behavior in the face of client fraud. While some oppose
any rules which would seemingly hamper the ideal of attorney-client
confidentiality, section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and corresponding SEC Rule
205 serve an overriding purpose because they promote the public policy of

transactions and statements of their clients. Credibility, based on professional standards and
reputation, is essential to their role because it enables the public to trust in their capability and
integrity. Typical categories of gatekeepers for public companies include independent auditors,
debt rating agencies, securities analysts, investment bankers, and lawyers. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404-05. See
also Nicholson, supra note 5, at 100-01.
8. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1417-18.
9. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 100-01. “Securities lawyers must continually strike a
balance between the competing considerations of protecting society’s interests in maintaining
client confidentiality and ensuring the lawyers’ loyalty on the one hand, and that of protecting
society’s interests in avoiding the substantial financial consequences of crimes or fraud on the
other.” Id. at 94-95.
10. 148 CONG. REC. S6561-01 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin).
11. Peter Zalewski, Sarbanes’ First Year: Lawyers and Executives Have Spent Months and
Money to Comply With Strict Corporate Governance Law, and More Limits Are Coming, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV., July 21, 2003, at 11; Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes Oxley
– Has the Landscape Changed?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 371, 371 (2003).
12. Zalewski, supra note 11.
13. Hereinafter the “Commission” or the “SEC.”
14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
15. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT

273

investor protection.16 Furthermore, traditional arguments against allowing
attorney disclosure of fraudulent conduct by the corporate client may be
misguided and poorly reasoned.
This comment will argue that federally mandated standards of attorney
conduct for corporate and securities lawyers are necessary in light of the
unique position these attorneys occupy. The previous regime of imprecise
federal standards, as well as conflicting and often inadequate state ethical
standards, have proven ineffective in regulating the conduct of attorneys in the
corporate arena.17 State ethics rules, which apply to attorneys generally, rarely
adequately account for the particular role of corporate and securities lawyers.
Because these attorneys are in the unique position of having to ensure their
clients’ compliance with federal securities laws,18 they must balance
competing interests: those of their clients and those of the investing public. In
order to successfully fulfill these dual roles, corporate and securities lawyers
need a federal set of guidelines which proscribe standards of appropriate
conduct when presented with client misconduct in order to successfully fulfill
these dual roles.
These standards should be imposed at the federal level because they serve
the ultimate purpose of promoting compliance with federal securities laws.
Furthermore, greater uniformity can be achieved by imposing these standards
at the federal level as opposed to the state level. Such uniformity is especially
desirable due to the national and even international scale of many corporate
clients and the law firms that represent them.
Section II of this comment explores the background and history of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and section 307 by first examining regulation of attorneys
by the SEC prior to the Act and then examining the social and economic
background of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and section 307. Section III will
discuss and explain section 307 of the Act and corresponding Rule 205 as
drafted by the SEC. Section IV will discuss the actions taken by the American
Bar Association in response to the corporate scandals which occurred at
corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco. Section V of this comment
will discuss the reactions of some state bar associations to Rule 205. Section
VI will present some of the major arguments both supporting and criticizing
the adoption of a federal rule regulating the conduct of corporate attorneys and
section VII will present a detailed analysis explaining why Rule 205 is
ultimately a justified and necessary addition to federal securities laws.

16. See infra Part VII.
17. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139.
18. Id. at 128.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A.

Federal Regulation of Attorneys Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley

Despite the traditional and well established role of the states and the
organized bar in regulating attorney conduct,19 federal regulation of corporate
attorneys is by no means a new concept.20 The SEC has traditionally used two
primary avenues for sanctioning attorneys.21 One approach available to the
SEC is to seek injunctions against attorneys in federal courts on the basis of
violations or aiding and abetting violations of the anti-fraud provisions of
federal securities laws.22
A prominent example of this first type is Securities and Exchange
Commission v. National Student Marketing Corp., in which the Commission
sought injunctive relief against numerous defendants, including some of the
lawyers representing their respective clients in a merger.23 The Commission
attempted to impose sanctions against the lawyers of one of the parties to the
merger, arguing that the lawyers had aided and abetted the client’s violations
of securities laws because the lawyers did not attempt to dissuade their clients
from going through with a planned merger upon discovery that some of the
information disclosed in proxy statements for the merger was false.24 In this
case, the SEC argued that because the attorneys did not withdraw their opinion
letters regarding the merger and demand resolicitation of the shareholders of
the company being acquired when they learned of certain misinformation, the
lawyers aided and abetted the fraud.25 The SEC further argued that had the
attorneys suggested an appropriate course of action and the directors refused,
the “attorneys should have withdrawn from the representation and informed
the shareholders or the Commission.”26 In this case, the court denied
injunctive relief, finding that the SEC failed to demonstrate, as is required
under section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 20(b)
of the Securities Act of 1933, that injunctive relief would be necessary to

19. JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK 64 (1993).
20. Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs.
Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 540-44 (1997).
21. Id. at 548. Maxey identifies other forms of sanctions available to the SEC as well: “In
appropriate cases, the SEC can also refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution. In addition, the SEC can issue reports on investigations pursuant to § 21(a) of the
Exchange Act.” Id. at 548 n.46.
22. Id. at 550.
23. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. 682, 686-87 (D.D.C. 1978).
24. Id. at 699-701.
25. Id. at 700-01.
26. Id. at 701.
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prevent further violations of anti-fraud provisions.27 The court did hold,
however, that the lawyers had aided and abetted the violations by not taking
steps to persuade the client to comply with the law or ensure that shareholders
were informed of the misstatements in the proxy solicitations.28 National
Student Marketing sent an important message to attorneys about the
Commission’s expectations regarding lawyers’ obligations when they become
aware that their client is violating securities laws. While the case did not
suggest a clear course of action in such a situation, it did make clear that the
Commission considered it unacceptable for attorneys to acquiesce to their
clients’ fraudulent conduct.29
A second regulatory tool available to the SEC is the use of Rule 102(e) of
the Commission’s Rules of Practice, which has long been available to the SEC
as a means of sanctioning securities lawyers.30 It allows the Commission to
censure, suspend, or disbar professionals engaged in unethical or otherwise
improper conduct;31 it does not, however, establish standards of behavior for
such professionals.32 Three years after the conclusion of National Student
Marketing, the Commission used its power to sanction professionals under
Rule 102(e) in “its most prominent administrative proceeding against
lawyers.”33 In In re Carter and Johnson (“Carter”), the Commission brought
an action against two lawyers for concealing their knowledge of a client’s poor

27. Id. at 717.
28. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. at 714.
29. Id. at 712.
30. Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004);
Maxey, supra note 20, at 548-49. Prior to 1995, Rule 102(e) was referred to as Rule 2(e), which
was originally promulgated in 1935. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 71671 n.11 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). Rule 102(e) does not apply strictly to lawyers, but rather any professionals
who appear and practice before the Commission, including attorneys, accountants, and engineers.
Id. at n.12.
31. Rule 102(e) provides:
The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter: (i) [n]ot to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others; or (ii) [t]o be lacking in character or integrity
or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (iii) [t]o have
willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the
Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(i)-(iii).
32. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at
71670 & n.11.
33. Maxey, supra note 20, at 551.
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financial position in order to ensure that a deal closed.34 The Commission
decided that there were no clear and unambiguous standards of behavior to
guide the attorneys in this case and therefore did not impose sanctions.35 The
Commission did, however, interpret the meaning of “unethical or improper
professional conduct”36 for purposes of Rule 102(e) proceedings against
attorneys, to be applied in any future proceedings.37
The standard laid down in Carter requires an attorney who becomes aware
of a client’s violation of securities laws to “take[] prompt steps to end the
client’s noncompliance.”38 Furthermore, the Commission indicated that as a
preliminary matter, the attorney may simply “counsel[] accurate disclosure.”39
Should the client fail to comply, however, the Commission stated that the
attorney should take additional “affirmative steps,” which could include
reporting the violation to higher officials within the organization in order to
correct the problem.40 In this respect, the standard supplied by this case is
simply a predecessor to the standards required by section 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act.41
The rule from Carter contributed to a mounting controversy between the
Bar and the SEC regarding the SEC’s attempts to infringe upon the Bar’s
traditional role in regulating attorney conduct.42 This controversy abated
somewhat when then SEC General Counsel Edward Greene, in a 1982 speech,
stated that the Commission would not initiate Rule 102(e) proceedings against
a lawyer unless a federal court had determined that the lawyer had violated or
aided and abetted a violation of securities laws.43 The SEC had abated its
ability to enforce the standards promulgated only a year before in Carter.
While still retaining the ability to discipline attorneys based on aiding or

34. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,158 (Feb. 28, 1981).
35. Id. at 84,172-73.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(ii).
37. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,172. Prior to Carter, the SEC had not previously defined this standard. Theodore Sonde & F.
Ryan Keith, “Up the Ladder and Over”: Regulating Securities Lawyers—Past, Present & Future,
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 331, 336 (2003).
38. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,172.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Like the standard first articulated in Carter, section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
required the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring an “up the ladder” reporting requirement for
corporate attorneys. See infra note 65 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
requirements of section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
42. Maxey, supra note 20, at 553.
43. Id.
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abetting liability or through Rule 102(e) sanctions, the Commission rarely did
so in the years following the Carter decision.44
B.

The Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 307

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came on the heels of various corporate and
accounting scandals which had severely shaken investor confidence in the
adequacy of corporate governance practices, independent accounting, and the
trustworthiness of corporate attorneys.45 During the 1990s, American
businesses and the stock market boomed.46 Companies, especially those in the
high-tech sector, announced huge profit increases every year, which were often
accompanied by huge increases in executive pay and compensation.47
According to Senator Arthur Levin, chairman of the Senate’s Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, this corporate success was seen as “a
justification for deregulating business, weakening regulators, and making it
harder to seek corporate insiders and advisers.”48 Levin contends, however,
that much of this loosening of corporate regulation shielded discovery of
corporate misconduct which may have in large part contributed to the inflated
profits of the 1990s.49
The most highly publicized corporate scandal leading up to SarbanesOxley involved the collapse of Enron Corp.50 When the public became aware
that Enron was creating outside partnerships as a means to remove debt from
its balance sheets, Enron executives and auditors were not the only ones to face
scrutiny and criticism.51 Enron’s outside attorneys, Vinson & Elkins, were
also implicated in the scandal.52 When the firm was brought in to investigate
suspicious activities at Enron, it issued opinion letters effectively authorizing
fraudulent and illegal activities of the corporation.53 The firm’s role in either
facilitating or at the very least overlooking the fraudulent activities of its client
is by no means a unique situation.54 The potential ability of lawyers to play a
more active role in promoting compliance with securities laws, and their
disappointingly frequent failure to do so, prompted some members of Congress

44. Id. at 553-55.
45. 148 CONG. REC. S6561-01 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at S6561-62.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., One Big Client, One Big Hassle, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2002), at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_04/b3767706.htm.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6556 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine).
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to suggest an addition to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that would enhance lawyers’
obligation to act as corporate gatekeepers.55
Section 307 was introduced based on the belief of its drafters that attorneys
likely played major roles in many of the corporate scandals that had occurred
in recent years.56 Senator Michael Enzi from Wyoming, one of the senators
who introduced the bill, stated: “[O]ne of the thoughts that occurred to me was
probably in almost every transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the
documents involved in that procedure.”57 This was the rationale behind
section 307. The accounting industry has long been under the scrutiny of the
federal government and the SEC due to the well established duty of corporate
accountants and auditors to act as corporate gatekeepers.58 Furthermore, the
SEC has had the power to regulate corporate attorneys for years under Rule
102(e).59 Despite this, regulation of attorney conduct has traditionally been

55. Id. at S6551. In introducing section 307 as a floor amendment, Senator Edwards stated:
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone . . . . If executives
and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that
the lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs. For the sake of investors
and regular employees, ordinary shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the
executives and the accountants do what they are responsible for doing, but also that the
lawyers do what they are responsible for doing as members of the bar and as citizens of
the country.
Id.
56. Id.
57. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6554 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
58. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995),
(“PSLRA”) added section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This section mandated
that outside auditors comply with standards issued by the SEC as well as Generally Accepted
Accounting Principals. The PSLRA also required accountants/auditors to report illegal acts to the
issuer’s audit committee. Finally, the PSLRA required that an accountant/auditor resign and
notify the SEC of the resignation and the reason for it if the issuer continues in the illegal activity.
Sonde & Keith, supra note 37, at 341-42. See also Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405. This final
requirement is almost identical to “noisy withdrawal” provision of SEC Rule 205 for attorneys.
See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
59. Speech to the New York County Lawyers’ Association by SEC General Counsel Edward
F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,089, at 84,800 (Jan. 18, 1982)
[hereinafter Greene]. See also Letter from Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law, University of
Illinois (and 39 other law professors), to Harvey Pitt, SEC Chairman 2 (Mar. 7, 2002), at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/responsibility_relatedmat.html)
[hereinafter Letter from Richard W. Painter]; Stephanie R.E. Patterson, Professional
Responsibility and Liability in a Post-Enron World: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Eroding the Legal Profession’s System of Self-Governance?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 155, 162
(2003).
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regarded as a job for state bar associations, and the federal government has
only reluctantly challenged state authority on this matter in the past.60
Following the revelation of multiple scandals in corporate America,61 the
sponsors of section 307 felt that the corporate attorney’s time had come.
Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of section 307, stated, “[w]ith
Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct we have seen, it
is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate themselves
no [sic] more than accountants should be left to regulate themselves.”62 The
general belief was that state bar associations had failed to adequately safeguard
against attorney misconduct and intervention by the federal government was
needed.63
III. SARBANES-OXLEY AND S.E.C. RULE 205
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to issue rules
establishing “minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers.”64 According to section 307, these standards should
include a rule
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the
company (or the equivalent thereof); and

60. See Greene, supra note 59, at 84,802. See also SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks
Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section (Aug. 12,
2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm. Twenty years ago Congress considered
and rejected Senator Arlen Specter’s legislation entitled “Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Act of
1983.” The legislation advocated imposing criminal sanctions against lawyers who failed to
disclose to law enforcement prospective future crimes of their corporate clients, as well as past
crimes where the client had misappropriated legal advice. Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T.
Wirtner, What Do You Do When Confronted With Client Fraud?, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct.
2002, at 39-40. The SEC has also occasionally used its power to sanction attorneys under Rule
102(e) or through aiding and abetting liability. See supra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
61. See 148 CONG. REC. S6561, S6562 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin)
for a discussion of some of the corporate scandals which occurred at major corporations like
WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc.
62. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
63. Id. Similarly, Senator Enzi remarked, “[I]n this case, the [s]tate bars as a whole have
failed. They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct to remedy this kind of situation.
Even if they do have a general rule that applies, it often goes unenforced.” Id. at S6555. See also
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71671 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
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(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the
audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee
of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.65

On January 23, 2003 the Commission announced its adoption of Rule
205.66 The basic provisions of Rule 205 provide for an “up the ladder”
reporting regime.67 According to the rule, an attorney must report evidence of
a material violation of securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty, or similar
violations to appropriate parties within the client corporation.68 An objective
standard should be applied in interpreting “evidence of a material violation”
meaning that it would be “unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”69 The
attorney must first report such evidence to the chief legal counsel, chief
executive officer, or both.70 The rule further outlines what actions must be
taken by a chief legal counsel who receives such information.71 The next step
an attorney may take if he or she does not reasonably believe the chief legal
65. Id. The SEC was given 180 days from the day the Act was signed into law (July 30,
2002), to adopt rules implementing section 307. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71670 n.4.
66. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct
Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm.
67. Id. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)-(4) (2004).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
69. Id. § 205.2(e).
70. Id. § 205.3(b)(1).
71. Id. § 205.3(b)(2).
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause such inquiry into the
evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to
determine whether the material violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing,
or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) determines no
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall notify the
reporting attorney and advise the reporting attorney of the basis for such determination.
Unless the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all
reasonable steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response, and shall advise the
reporting attorney thereof. In lieu of causing an inquiry under this paragraph (b), a chief
legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) may refer a report of evidence of a material
violation to a qualified legal compliance committee under paragraph (c)(2) of this section
if the issuer has duly established a qualified legal compliance committee prior to the
report of evidence of a material violation.
Id.
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officer or chief executive officer has taken appropriate steps is to report to the
audit committee of the board of directors; another committee consisting solely
of directors not employed by the corporation and not “interested persons” in
the case of an investment company; or the actual board of directors.72
In the original proposed Rule 205, the SEC included a provision which
would require an attorney to make a “noisy withdrawal” where an attorney had
reported up the ladder and the board of directors had not provided an
“appropriate response.”73 This portion of the rule required an attorney, in
limited circumstances, to withdraw from representation and give the SEC
written notification of the attorney’s withdrawal on the basis of “professional
considerations” as well as disaffirm any documents or representations made to
the SEC “that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the

72. Id. § 205.3(b)(3). Under 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c), the rule provides an alternative reporting
method where the corporate client has established a qualified legal compliance committee
(“QLCC”). Where such a committee has been established the attorney may report directly to this
committee as opposed to the “up the ladder” process outlined in section 205.3(b). An attorney
who reports to a QLCC has satisfied his or her legal obligations under Rule 205 and is not
expected to assess the committee’s response to any reports of material violations. 17 C.F.R. §
205.3(c)(1).
73. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326-27 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
Section 205.2(b) provides:
(b) Appropriate response means a response to an attorney regarding reported evidence of
a material violation as a result of which the attorney reasonably believes:
(1) That no material violation . . . has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur;
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial measures, including
appropriate steps or sanctions to stop any material violations that are ongoing, to prevent
any material violation that has yet to occur, and to remedy or otherwise appropriately
address any material violation that has already occurred and to minimize the likelihood of
its recurrence; or
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer’s board of directors, a committee thereof
to whom a report could be made pursuant to § 205.3(b)(3), or a qualified legal compliance
committee, has retained or directed an attorney to review the reported evidence of a
material violation and either: (i) [h]as substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by such attorney after a reasonable investigation and evaluation
of the reported evidence; or (ii) [h]as been advised that such attorney may, consistent with
his or her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or
the issuer’s officer, director, employee, or agent as the case may be) in any investigation
or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a material
violation.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b). This definition of what constitutes an “appropriate response” subjects the
lawyer’s evaluation of the issuer’s response to a reasonableness standard. An attorney may
exercise his or her own judgment, so long as his or her determination is “reasonable.”
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6298-99 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
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attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading.”74 On
November 21, 2002, the SEC released a proposed version of Rule 205 and
invited interested parties to comment on the rule.75 The Commission’s release
generated significant interest; 167 comment letters were received.76 The
“noisy withdrawal” provision was one of the most controversial and highly
criticized portions of the proposed rule.77 Due to the controversy generated by
this provision of the rule, and the deadlines imposed by the Act, the
Commission withdrew this portion in its final version of the rule, released on
January 29, 2003.78 On that date the Commission also issued another release
seeking further comment on the “noisy withdrawal” provision and an
alternative version of this portion of the rule.79 Whereas the original version of
the “noisy withdrawal” provision required the attorney to withdraw from
representation and alert the Commission, the alternative suggested by the
Commission in the January 29th proposed rule release required the issuer, as
opposed to the attorney, to report the attorney’s withdrawal to the Commission,
and additionally required the issuer to report such withdrawal to the public
through 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F forms.80 While the Commission has received
74. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6326-27.
75. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at
71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
76. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6296.
77. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm [hereinafter Carlton Letter]; Letter
from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/abcny040703.htm.
78. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6296. The release accompanying the final rule stated:
In light of the compressed time period resulting from the 180-day implementation
deadline prescribed in the Act, a number of commenters requested that the Commission
allow additional time for consideration of several aspects of the proposed rule,
including . . . the impact of the “noisy withdrawal” and related provisions.
Id.
79. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6326.
80. Id. The release states:
Section 205.3(e) of the alternative proposal requires an issuer (rather than its
attorney) to report to the Commission an attorney’s written notice of withdrawal or failure
to receive an appropriate response, as described in [section] 205.3(d) of the alternative
proposal. In connection with [section] 205.3(e) of the alternative proposal, the
Commission also proposes to amend Forms 8-K, 20-F, and 40-F to require issuers to
disclose publicly an attorney’s written notice of withdrawal within two business days of
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numerous comments on both of these proposed alternatives, no decision has
been made as to whether either one will eventually be included in the final
rule.81
To account for the situation where the attorney has reported “up the
ladder” and does not believe appropriate remedial actions have been taken by
the corporate client,82 the final rule as adopted also includes a provision
allowing an attorney to reveal confidential information related to the
representation of the client to the extent the he or she reasonably believes
necessary
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or
investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative
proceeding from committing perjury . . . or committing any act . . . likely to
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were
used.83

This section of the rule is in line with Rule 1.6 of the ABA’s recent
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct84 and with the rules
of a majority of state bar associations.85 Though not nearly as controversial as
the “noisy withdrawal” provision, this section of the rule prompted some

that notice. Section 205.3(f) of the alternative proposal permits (but does not require) an
attorney to inform the Commission of his or her withdrawal if the issuer does not comply
with paragraph (e).
Id. at 6328.
81. Sue Reisinger, Coping with Tighter Rules for Lawyers: Violations Must Go ‘Up the
Ladder.’ Will ‘to the Government’ Be Next?, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at 8.
82. See supra note 73 for the Commission’s definition of an “appropriate response” by an
issuer.
83. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
84. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
85. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6310 n.92. See also TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 48-50 (2003), at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
final_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT].
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criticism,86 and while the SEC considered removing it from the final rule, it
was ultimately included with only minor changes from the original proposal.87
IV. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESPONSE
In what may have been an attempt to avoid federal regulation of attorney
conduct,88 the ABA, before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, established the
Corporate Responsibility Task Force (“Task Force”) to deal with the problem
of attorney participation in and tolerance of corporate misconduct.89 The Task
Force issued its final report on March 31, 2003,90 suggesting two major
changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.91 One change was an
amendment to Model Rule 1.13, which covers the organization as client.92 The
amendments to Rule 1.13 include a mandatory “reporting up” requirement,
requiring that an attorney representing an organization report crime or fraud to
“higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization.”93 Rule 1.13 was further amended to provide that, where an
attorney has referred a violation of law to the highest authority in an
organization and such authority fails to address the referral “in a timely and
appropriate manner,” the attorney may “reveal information relating to the
representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial
injury to the organization.”94 The changes to Rule 1.13(b) impose a fairly
86. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6310-11.
87. Id. at 6310.
88. Corporate Lawyers Smell a Rat, N.Y. LAW. (Sept. 26, 2002), at
http://www.nylawyer.com/news/02/09/092602d.html. Bruce A. Green, an ethics professor at
Fordham University School of Law, was quoted as saying: “If for no other reason, the
recommendations were an attempt to head Congress off at the pass.” Id. Despite the ABA’s
hopes to self-regulate before Congress could take action, Sarbanes-Oxley, which included section
307 that mandated Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, was signed into law on July 30,
2002, two weeks after the Task Force issued its preliminary report. Id.
89. Linnea B. McCord & Gia H. Weisdorn, Blowing the Whistle: Will Your Corporate
Attorney Be the New Whistleblower?, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REP. 6, ¶ 9 (2003), at
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/033/lawyers.html.
90. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85.
91. Id. at 77-89.
92. Id. at 82-89; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003). The Task Force recommended this
change to Rule 1.13(b) because, by suggesting some general potential courses of action, the
former rule could “confuse rather than clarify the mandatory nature of the lawyer’s obligations
under the rule.” ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 41-44.
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003). Under pre-amended Rule
1.13(c), the attorney had the option to resign in accordance with Rule 1.16. The pre-amended
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similar duty to that required by the “up the ladder” requirements of section 307
of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC Rule 205.95
The Task Force also recommended changes to Model Rule 1.6.96 Prior to
the 2003 amendments, Rule 1.6 permitted an attorney to disclose client
confidences in limited circumstances: “to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm; to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance
with these Rules; to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . or
to comply with other law or court order.”97 While the ABA’s Model Rules are
typically consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct in most states,98 the
majority of states had gone beyond the limits of Model Rule 1.6 and provided
further exceptions to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality in their rules of
professional conduct.99 It was in recognition of this fact that the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000
Commission”) suggested updating Model Rule 1.6 to better reflect the law in
most states in its August 2001 report.100 Ultimately, the ABA House of
Delegates rejected the recommended changes in its 2001 amendments.101
However, in light of increasing scrutiny of the failure of gatekeepers following

rule did not permit the attorney to “reveal information relating to the representation.” The
amended comments to Rule 1.13 state:
Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon
which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not
modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(6). Under Paragraph (c) the
lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization’s highest authority insists
upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and
then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably
certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer’s services
be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the
lawyer’s representation of the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (2003).
95. Judith Burns, Attorneys Face a Paradox in the SEC’s Conduct Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug.
19, 2003, at C1.
96. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 77-81.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
98. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 136.
99. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 51. According to the final
report of the Task Force, “forty-one states permit a lawyer to disclose client information in order
to prevent a client from perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and eighteen states permit
such disclosure to rectify substantial loss resulting from client crime or fraud in which the client
used the lawyer’s services.” Id. at 49. The report provides a state by state break down of which
states allow disclosure and under what circumstances. Id. at 49 n.89.
100. Id. at 52. See ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS 2000
REPORT 20-26 (2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report_home.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2004).
101. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 143-44.
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the corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others,102 as well as
a desire to “keep Congress from intruding on its turf,”103 the ABA established
the Task Force in 2002, and was once again offered the suggestion of updating
Model Rule 1.6.104 This time, the House of Delegates listened. At its August
2003 Annual Meeting, the ABA House of Delegates added two further
exceptions to the general mandate of Rule 1.6 prohibiting disclosure of client
confidences.105 According to the amended rule, a lawyer is permitted to
disclose client confidences
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s
services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer’s services.106

The amendments to Model Rule 1.6 permit attorneys to breach client
confidentiality and report the misconduct of corporate clients if necessary to
prevent or rectify criminal or fraudulent acts of such clients that could cause
financial harm to others.107 This change to the Model Rules is important
because it is a more accurate reflection of the existing law in the majority of
states.108 However, the changes and additions may have little practical effect.
The final version of Rule 205 was published in the Federal Register on
February 6, 2003,109 months before the ABA House of Delegates met to amend
their Model Rules.110 Furthermore, because the changes to Rule 1.6 merely
bridge the gap between the ABA’s former position and the approach already

102. 148 CONG. REC. S6561, S6561-63 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin).
103. Corporate Lawyers Smell a Rat, supra note 88.
104. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 77-81.
105. Myron Levin, ABA Code Targets Corporate Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at C1.
The general rule regarding client confidences provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b).” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
107. Id.
108. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 51.
109. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6296 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
110. Nat Slavin, ABA Sends General Counsel on a Rough Ride, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
2003, at 4.
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taken by most states in their rules of professional conduct,111 these changes
should only have a minor impact upon the rules of individual states.
V. STATE BAR REACTIONS AND THE PREEMPTION DEBATE
When the SEC released the final version of Rule 205, it noted in the
accompanying release that some commentators on Rule 205 questioned
whether the Commission’s rule could preempt state ethics codes.112 The
Commission responded to these concerns, stating:
The language which we adopt today clarifies that this part does not
preempt ethical rules in United States jurisdictions that establish more rigorous
obligations than imposed by this part. At the same time, the Commission
reaffirms that its rules shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of
a state or other United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is admitted or
practices.113

Despite the SEC’s assertions, the Washington State Bar Association’s Board of
Governors took issue with the rule, and released an Interim Formal Ethics
Opinion on July 26, 2003,114 ten days before Rule 205 was to take effect,
warning Washington attorneys not to reveal any client confidences outside of
the corporate organization.115 The opinion clearly states: “To the extent that
the SEC regulations authorize but do not require revelation of client
confidences and secrets under certain circumstances, a Washington lawyer
should not reveal such confidences and secrets unless authorized to do so
under the RPCs [Rules of Professional Conduct].”116

111. Carlton Letter, supra note 77.
112. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6297. In the release accompanying Final Rule 205 the Commission stated:
A number of commenters questioned the Commission’s authority to preempt state
ethics rules, at least without being explicitly authorized and directed to do so by Congress.
Another comment letter noted that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants the federal
government the power to regulate the securities industry, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires the Commission to establish rules setting forth minimum standards of conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before it, and that, under the Supremacy Clause, duly
adopted Commission rules will preempt conflicting state rules.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Washington State Bar Association Board of Governors, Interim Formal Ethics Opinion
Re: The Effect of the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations on Washington Attorneys’ Obligations
Under the RPCs (2003), at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/ethics/default1.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Washington Ethics Opinion]; Sue Reisinger, Two State Bar Groups Protest
SEC Rule on Disclosing Civil Violations, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 29, 2003, at 18.
115. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 114, at 1.
116. Id.
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Under Rule 1.6 of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, an
attorney may only reveal client confidences in very limited circumstances.117
Like the SEC rule, this is a permissive rule; the lawyer is not required to report
anything. The important distinction between the Washington ethics rule and
SEC Rule 205 is the circumstances under which a lawyer may make such
disclosures. Under the Washington rule, such disclosure is limited to the
extent necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime, to establish a
claim or defense on the lawyer’s behalf, to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the representation, or pursuant to a court order.118
Under Rule 205, however, an attorney is authorized to reveal client
confidences to the SEC to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
necessary to prevent the client from committing a material violation likely to
cause “injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors.”119
Furthermore, a “material violation” is defined in the rule to mean “a material
violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty . . . , or a similar material violation of any
United States federal or state law.”120 Therefore, the SEC’s rule allows for
disclosure under a much broader set of circumstances than Washington’s rule
permits.
In order to prevent Washington state attorneys from relying on an
argument of good faith compliance with the SEC Rule,121 the Washington
opinion clearly states “an attorney who takes action contrary to this Formal
Opinion cannot . . . fairly claim to be complying in good faith with the SEC

117. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1990). The Washington rule prohibits a
lawyer from revealing client confidences or secrets relating to the representation except “to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) [t]o prevent the client from committing a
crime; or (2) [t]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . .” Id.
118. Id.
119. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i). An attorney may also reveal client confidences to the
Commission in two other situations under Rule 205:
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative proceeding
from committing perjury . . . or committing any act . . . likely to perpetrate a fraud upon
the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may
cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in
the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were used.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(2).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i).
121. Subsection (c) of Rule 205.6 states: “An attorney who complies in good faith with the
provisions of this part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent
standards imposed by any state or other United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted
or practices.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c).
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Regulations.”122 The Board justifies this assertion by arguing that there would
be no conflict between Rule 205 and the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct.123 Furthermore, because Rule 205 is permissive,124 an attorney may
comply with the stricter Washington RPCs limiting disclosure and still
technically be “in compliance” with the SEC Regulations.125 The Board
argues that because Rule 205.6(c) uses the term “complies”126 a lawyer can use
this good faith defense against state disciplinary actions only in relation to
mandatory, not permissive, provisions of the SEC Regulations.127
In an attempt to dissuade the Washington Bar from issuing its opinion,
SEC General Counsel Giovanni Prezioso wrote a letter to the President and
President-Elect of the Washington Bar Board of Governors on July 23,
2003.128 He began by noting that because Rule 205 applies only in limited
circumstances, conflicts between the state and federal laws would be
uncommon.129 Prezioso then discounted the Washington Bar’s argument that
such conflicts would not occur.130 Furthermore, he argued that Supreme Court
precedent clearly validates the Commission’s ability to preempt conflicting
state law.131 Prezioso referred to Sperry v. State of Florida132 to establish “the
authority of federal agencies to implement rules of conduct that diverge from
and supersede state laws that address the same conduct.”133 Prezioso also

122. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 114, at 7.
123. Id.
124. “[T]he fact that Section 205(d)(2) states that a lawyer ‘may reveal’ confidential
information but does not mandate a revelation gives the lawyer discretion to determine whether to
make such a disclosure.” Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 144, at 7.
128. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC General Counsel, to J. Richard Manning,
President, and David W. Savage, President-Elect, Washington State Bar Association (July 23,
2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm [hereinafter Letter from Giovanni
P. Prezioso]. Prezioso’s intent was clearly to convince the Washington State Bar Board of
Governors to back down from the position taken in the Washington Ethics Opinion. He stated:
“As the Board of Governors considers the Proposed Interim Formal Opinion, and as the WSBA
RPC Committee contemplates revisions to Washington RPC 1.6, perhaps these comments will aid
your deliberations by providing the Commission’s perspective on the relevant sections of its new
attorney-conduct rules.” Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Prezioso’s letter states: “Despite the narrow scope of the Commission’s rules, the
Proposed Interim Formal Opinion does identify potential areas of conflict.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
133. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128. In Sperry, the Supreme Court held
that, where Federal Patent Office regulations authorized practice before the Patent Office by nonlawyers, Florida could not enjoin a non-lawyer from preparing and prosecuting patent
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asserted that Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta134 establishes
that where a state law prohibits an attorney from pursuing a course of action
which the attorney has discretion to pursue based on a federal regulation, the
federal regulation takes priority.135 Finally, Prezioso disputed the Washington
Bar’s assertions regarding the ability of an attorney to establish a defense of
good faith compliance with federal regulations in a state disciplinary
proceeding.136 Prezioso cited several Supreme Court cases in asserting that,
when interpreting a federal regulation, states must defer to the federal agency’s
interpretation.137 Therefore, it would be improper for Washington’s State Bar
to determine whether an attorney could establish a “good faith” defense in a
state disciplinary proceeding; as such, a determination of what constitutes
“good faith” compliance should be made by the SEC.138
While Washington attempted to make the argument that there was not
necessarily a conflict between the SEC Rule and the Washington Rules of
Professional Conduct,139 some members of the California Bar took an even
stronger stance in opposition to the SEC’s Rule 205.140 In an August 13, 2003
letter to Prezioso,141 the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section
of the California State Bar (the “Committee”) questioned the SEC’s authority

applications in Florida, even though such practice was unauthorized under Florida’s State Bar
rules. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 400-03.
134. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
135. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128 (quoting de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at
155).
136. Id. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Washington
ethics opinion’s position regarding the unavailability a “good faith” compliance defense.
137. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128. Prezioso’s letter cites three Supreme
Court cases for this assertion: Barnard v. Walton, 535 U.S 212 (2002), United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 108 (2000), and City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1989).
138. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128.
139. Peter Erlichman, a spokesman for the Washington Bar, stated that because Rule 205 is
permissive, not mandatory, the Washington Bar had found no conflict between the SEC rule and
Washington law. Sue Reisinger, States’ Rights All Over Again, CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2003, at 24.
140. George A. Riemer, SEC v. State Bars? Preemption Showdowns Could Be on the
Horizon, OR. ST. BAR BULL., Dec. 2003, at 22.
141. This letter was written in response to SEC General Counsel Giovanni P. Prezioso’s July
23, 2003 public statement/letter to the Washington State Bar Association. The position set forth
in this letter is that of the twenty-five member Corporations Committee of the Business Law
Section of the State Bar of California; it has not been adopted by the California State Bar as a
whole or by the Business Law Section. Letter from the Corporations Committee of the Business
Law Section, State Bar of California, to Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 13, 2003), at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com/
Issues/0903.htm [hereinafter Corporations Committee Letter].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT

291

to preempt state ethics rules.142 Like Washington, California imposes a stricter
duty upon its attorneys with regard to maintaining client confidences.143 The
permissive disclosure allowed by Rule 205 is contrary to this standard.144 In
its letter to the SEC, the Committee made a strong argument questioning the
authority of the Commission to adopt Rule 205 in its current form.145
According to the Committee, “the preemptive effect of these rules will be
challenged on the basis that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to
preempt state ethics rules.”146 The Committee went on to point out that “in
other instances, courts have struck down SEC rulemaking for lack of
authority,”147 and argued that none of the statutory provisions which the SEC
relied on as authority in adopting the final version of Rule 205 demonstrate

142. Id. “The Committee believes that the authority of the SEC to adopt either Rule 205.3(d)
or Rule 205.6(c) could be challenged and that it is realistic to believe that the SEC’s authority will
be challenged.” Id.
143. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2004). Section 6068(e)(1) requires an
attorney to “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve
the secrets, of his or her client.” Effective July 1, 2004, section 6068 was amended to allow
permissive disclosure where necessary to prevent a criminal act likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm. This is the still, however, the only exception to the California lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality. Id. See also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-600 (2003)
(describing an attorney’s duty of confidentiality in the representation of an organization). This
duty has also been adopted by federal district courts in California:
Thus, attorneys appearing and practicing before these federal courts are obligated to
comply with California’s rules regarding the protection of client confidences. For
example, Local Rule No. 83-3.1.2 of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California Provides:
In order to maintain the effective administration of justice and the integrity of the
Court, each attorney shall be familiar with and comply with the standards of
professional conduct required of members of the State Bar of California and contained
in the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California,
and the decisions of any court applicable thereto. These statutes, rules and decisions
are hereby adopted as the standards of professional conduct, and any breach or
violation thereof may be the basis for the imposition of discipline.
Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.
144. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
145. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.
146. Id. The committee has not been alone in advancing this argument based on legislative
intent. Michael O’Sullivan, a corporate partner at Los Angeles law firm Munger Tolles & Olson,
argued that the cases cited by Prezioso (in his letter to the Washington State Bar Association
Board of Governors) as the basis for federal preemption were based on congressional intent,
whereas the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley does not indicate an intent to change lawyers’
reporting requirements to the SEC. Sue Reisinger, Two State Bar Groups Protest SEC Rule on
Disclosing Civil Violations, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 29, 2003, at 18. According to
O’Sullivan, on a number of occasions members of Congress were told that the bill would not
require corporate lawyers to report to the SEC. Id.
147. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.
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congressional intent to allow the SEC to grant corporate lawyers the right to
disclose client confidences.148 Furthermore, the Committee’s letter discounted
Prezioso’s reliance on Sperry v. State of Florida as authority for the SEC’s
ability to preempt state law.149 In Sperry, the Committee argued, there was
clear Congressional intent to grant a federal agency the authority to formulate
regulations,150 whereas here, there was no evidence that Congress intended the
SEC to have the authority to preempt state ethical rules and grant attorneys a
right of permissive disclosure to the SEC.151 Furthermore, the Committee
noted that the United States Supreme Court has previously made a point of
avoiding the federalization of corporate laws, an area typically governed by
state law, “absent a clear indication of congressional intent” to do so.152 The
Committee cited the language of federal case law to reiterate this point.153 The
court in Pennsylvania Medical Soc’y v. Marconis stated “[w]hen Congress
remains silent regarding the preemptive effect of its legislation on state laws it
knows to be in existence at the time of such legislation’s passing, Congress has
failed to evince the requisite clear and manifest purpose to supersede those
state laws.”154
After questioning the authority of the SEC to pass Rule 205 in its current
form, the Committee’s letter to the SEC raises another important objection.
148. Id. The Committee’s letter states:
In the adopting [sic] the final rules, the SEC cites as authority the following statutory
provisions: Sections 3, 307, and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Section 19 of the
Securities Act of 1933; Sections 3(b), 4(C), 13 and 23 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Sections 38 and 39 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and Section 211 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Not one of these statutes even hints that Congress
intended to invest the SEC with broad authority to permit lawyers disclose [sic] client
secrets much less require that they do so and then immunize or otherwise protect those
lawyers who do.
Id. Furthermore, in evaluating the SEC’s reliance on section 307 as granting authority to adopt a
rule making disclosure of client confidences to the SEC permissive in certain circumstances, the
Committee states that “references in Section 307 to ‘public interest’ and ‘protection of investors’
are simply too general to evidence any actual intent by Congress to empower the SEC to adopt
rules allowing attorneys to divulge client confidences and establish immunity for those who do.”
Id. at n.9.
149. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. See supra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Prezioso’s reliance on Sperry v. State of Florida.
150. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. The letter also argues that Sperry can
be distinguished from the present situation because, in that case, the regulations of the Patent
Office allowed non-lawyers to practice before it, which was a commonplace occurrence before
Congress passed the statute. Id. However, in this situation, “the SEC’s rules represent a radical
change from historical patters of state regulation of attorneys.” Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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According to the Committee, Article III, section 3.5 of the California
Constitution prevents the State Bar from failing to enforce section 6068(e) of
the California Business and Professions Code.155 Section 3.5 states:
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the
Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power . . . (c) To declare a statute
unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that federal law or
federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate
court has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is
prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.156

Based on this section, the Committee argued that the State Bar is required to
enforce section 6068(e), despite the claims of the SEC that Rule 205
preempts.157 Furthermore, a final order or judgment of an appellate court158
upholding the preemptive effect of the federal law would be necessary in order
for the State Bar to fail to enforce section 6068(e) in favor of Rule 205.159
In a speech before the New York City Bar Association160 SEC
Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid161 commented upon some of the
preemption issues raised by the Washington opinion and the letter from the
Committee of the California Bar.162 Goldschmid pointed out that section 307
of the Act states that the “Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest
and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys . . . including a rule . . . [requiring ‘reporting
up’].”163 Goldschmid argued that this language clearly indicates that Congress
intended the SEC to have fairly broad discretion in drafting these standards.164
Furthermore, while not commenting upon the letter from the Corporations
Committee of the Business Law Section of the California State Bar,

155. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. See supra note 143 for a discussion of
section 6068(e).
156. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
157. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6297 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 205); Letter from Giovanni P.
Prezioso, supra note 128.
158. The Committee’s letter states that a judgment from a trial court would not be sufficient.
In order for the State Bar to refuse to enforce section 6068(e), an affirmation by an appellate court
would be needed. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.
159. Id.
160. Goldschmid Speech, supra note 7.
161. Harvey Goldschmid has been a Commissioner of the SEC since July of 2002. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)).
164. Id. Goldschmid stated: “Obviously, the words ‘minimum standards’ and ‘including’ are
critical to any serious consideration of the various ‘reporting out’ issues that I am about to
discuss.” Id.
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Goldschmid said the following with regard to the Washington Interim Formal
Ethics Opinion:
I believe that the position of the Washington State Bar Association is legally
untenable, and its ethical opinion constitutes an essentially lawless act. In
policy terms, the Washington State Bar Association is acting contrary to the
positions of the SEC, at least 40 states, and, since August, the American Bar
Association. It will be a tragedy, for which the Washington State Bar
Association will have to accept substantial responsibility, if a Washington
State lawyer – who would have “reported out” ongoing, serious financial fraud
– fails to do so on the basis of the Bar Association’s deeply flawed ethical
opinion.165

While thus far, the conflict between the states and the SEC has yet to come to a
head, the fact that such a conflict will eventually occur appears to be
inevitable.166 Both the Washington Bar and the Committee of the California
Bar have posed serious challenges to Rule 205, setting the stage for future
questions and confusion.
VI. ARGUMENTS FAVORING AND OPPOSING RULE 205
A.

Arguments Favoring Federal Standards for Attorney Conduct

While the SEC gave corporate attorneys some indication of what standards
of behavior the Commission expected them to adhere to in cases such as In re
Carter and SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,167 the task of regulating
and disciplining attorneys was still seen primarily as the role of state bar

165. Goldschmid Speech, supra note 7.
166. While such a conflict is likely to occur at some point, the question of when is much less
clear. Goldschmid makes an important point in his speech to the New York City Bar Association.
He argues that issues related to reporting outside a corporate client when such client has failed to
stop or rectify fraud or other serious violations, “while of large emotional concern to many in the
bar, are of considerably less practical importance than the ‘reporting up’ approach . . . it will be a
most unusual circumstance . . . where reporting up to senior executives and independent directors
will not stop wrongdoing or reckless behavior.” Id. Goldschmid’s statement seems especially
valid in light of the “zero tolerance” regulatory environment post Sarbanes-Oxley. John J.
Falvey, Jr. & Matthew A. Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A Tale of
Sound and Fury?, 12 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 23 (2003). If an attorney could
potentially report violations outside the corporate entity, it seems likely that corporate actors
would do everything in their power to avoid such an outcome.
167. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text. In Carter, the SEC warned that lawyers
must “take prompt steps to end the client’s noncompliance,” yet failed to explain what course of
action an attorney in that position should pursue. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 120 (quoting In re
Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28,
1981)).
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associations.168 While these cases gave some indication of appropriate
behavior, the standards are merely suggestive, and the infrequent use of
sanctions under Rule 102(e) and aiding and abetting liability pursuant to Rule
10b-5 have provided only limited guidance to corporate attorneys.169 Prior to
Rule 205, there was no consistent set of guidelines for corporate lawyers to
follow when they became aware of fraudulent conduct by their clients.170
While some have criticized the rule because it requires an attorney to make
difficult determinations as to the legality of the client’s conduct,171 it serves an
important purpose by providing attorneys with a framework of actions not
available under the myriad of current federal securities laws or state ethical
rules.172
Not only does Rule 205 provide lawyers with a workable framework of
potential behavior, it also remedies the problem of inconsistency in the current
scheme of state ethics rules governing attorney conduct in this area.173
Professor of legal ethics Richard W. Painter, commenting on the SEC’s
proposed Rule 205, stated that “[w]hen the client is an issuer of securities
subject to federal securities laws, there should be a nationwide standard
allowing the lawyer to disclose.”174 Current state ethics rules on client
confidentiality impose inconsistent standards regarding disclosure of
confidential information.175 Such inconsistency is especially troubling for law
firms with offices in different jurisdictions, or any attorney or firm

168. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
169. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of lawyer liability
under SEC Rules 102(e) and 10b-5.
170. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107.
171. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
172. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 120-22, 136.
173. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59 (commenting on proposed Rule 205).
174. Id. See also Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139. In arguing for the need for the American
Bar Association to update its current Model Rules to allow permissive disclosure by attorneys
faced with client fraud, Nicholson states:
[A]n amended Model Rule 1.6 will promote uniformity among the states. The ABA’s
goal of uniformity by establishing clear-cut rules is lost with respect to Model Rule 1.6.
However, as in the case of the professional responsibility rules in other substantive areas,
an amended Model Rule 1.6 could persuade all states to review their existing rules and
sign on to a new, clear-cut ABA disclosure standard.
Id. Since publication of Nicholson’s article, the ABA has made changes to Model Rule 1.6. See
supra Part IV.
175. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 136-37. “An overwhelming majority of these states have
adopted, whole cloth, the standards articulated by the ABA in most of the significant areas of
professional responsibility, with one glaring exception: client confidentiality. States have
adopted varying versions of Model Rule 1.6. Consequently, Model Rule 1.6 is anything but the
‘model.’” Id. at 136.
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representing a national or multi-national corporation.176 For example, a large
firm with offices in both Hawaii and California faces a special dilemma.
Under the laws of one state, disclosure in certain circumstances is mandatory,
but in another it may not be permitted at all.177
Furthermore, Rule 205’s permissive disclosure standard does not
necessarily pose a threat to the lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality owed to
the client. According to legal scholar Paul G. Haskell, while the duty of
confidentiality is unquestionably an important one, it should not necessarily be
applied in all situations.178 In his book Why Lawyers Behave as They Do,
Haskell states that “[t]he purpose of confidentiality is to facilitate the lawyer’s
efforts to obtain what the client is entitled to under the law.”179 By this
reasoning, the purpose of confidentiality is not served when the client has
committed a fraud, because the client is not entitled to do so under the law.
Similarly, in discussing pre-amended Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, professor of law Lisa Nicholson points out that the right
to confidentiality should effectively be waived by a client who wrongfully uses
the attorney’s legal services.180 Where a client puts the attorney in such a
situation, the attorney is exposed to potential liability.181 As Nicholson states,
“[W]here clients abuse the lawyer-client relationship, they should be deemed
to have waived any claim to client confidentiality that is a by-product of such
relationship.”182
B.

Arguments Opposing Federal Standards of Attorney Conduct

Many legal scholars and practitioners have long been opposed to any
change in federal securities laws or the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that may hamper the lawyer’s ability to fulfill his duty of
confidentiality and zealous advocacy. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-

176. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59 (commenting on Proposed Rule 205).
177. See HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
6068(e) (West 2004).
178. PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 59 (1998).
179. Id. at 57. Haskell specifically discusses the non-applicability of confidentiality when a
client seeks a lawyer’s assistance in connection with the commission of a crime. However,
Haskell’s argument for why the duty of confidentiality should not apply in such circumstances is
equally applicable to a situation where the client has or is going to commit fraud or a violation of
securities laws.
180. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 147. While Nicholson’s argument relates to a client actually
using the attorney’s services in committing fraud, the same argument can be applied where the
client has asked the attorney to keep confidential information relating to a past or ongoing fraud
or crime.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Oxley Act, the President of the State Bar of Texas criticized section 307 of the
Act:183
Historically, and in the best interest of our clients as well as the general
public, lawyers have not been perceived as ‘certified public attorneys.’ Our
responsibility has been to our clients, with specific rules that apply if our
opinions and/or advice are known by us as being intended to be relied upon by
third parties or the public in general. Our responsibility is and should continue
to be to zealously represent our clients. We are not and should not be expected
to be whistleblowers, corporate policeman, [sic] or graders of the accountant’s
school papers.184

The most frequently cited argument against permissive disclosure is that it
would harm the attorney’s ability to zealously represent the client.185 The
traditional reasoning for the rule regarding client confidentiality is that if the
client cannot trust that all communications with the attorney will be kept
confidential, the client will not feel comfortable communicating with the
attorney in order to seek legal advice.186 Many attorneys do not feel that they
should be held responsible for protecting the public-at-large in addition to
protecting the interests of their individual clients.187
Lawrence J. Fox, an attorney at Drinker, Biddle & Reath in Philadelphia,
has consistently been a vigilant and vocal supporter of the importance of
protecting client confidentiality.188 Fox has stated, “Academics have this lofty
notion that lawyers should do good for society. But I’m not buying it. I don’t
think we should put the lawyers in a position where they have duties to the

183. Guy Harrison, Protecting Our Profession, 65 TEX. BAR J. 678 (2002).
184. Id.
185. Mitchell Pacelle & Michael Schroeder, Proposed SEC Rules Could Turn Lawyers Into
Whistle-Blowers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A1. See also Corporations Committee Letter,
supra note 141. The letter of the Corporations Committee of the California Bar states:
The Committee recognizes that lawyers in private practice can play a unique and often
pivotal role under the federal securities laws. Nonetheless, that role does not make private
attorneys an adjunct to the SEC in enforcing those laws. Indeed, the Committee believes
that our adversarial system of justice will not work unless attorneys can act as
independent advocates and advisers to their clients.
Id.
186. James P. Schaller, The Wrong Tack: Upending Client Confidentiality Would Destroy
Client Confidence, CAL. LAW (Aug. 15, 2001), at www.law.com/regionals/ca/opinions/stories/
edt0815_com_schaller.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2004); Steven Andersen, Plaintiffs Chip Away
at Attorney-Client Privilege, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2003, at 22.
187. Sarah Boxer, Lawyers Are Asking, How Secret Is a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001,
at B7.
188. Id. See also LAWRENCE J. FOX, ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ETHICS 2000 MINORITY REPORT (2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2kdissent.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
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public, except in cases of death or bodily harm.”189 When the ABA Ethics
2000 Commission proposed changes to the Model Rule 1.6, which would
allow disclosure to “prevent, mitigate or rectify a client fraud in which the
lawyer’s services have been employed,” Fox disagreed with the Commission’s
recommendations in his dissenting opinion.190 Fox cited a number of reasons
why attorneys should not be allowed to disclose clients’ confidences.191 One
major problem cited by Fox is that asking an attorney to be responsible for
catching client fraud may be asking too much.192 Fox argues: “The false
premise is that when a lawyer is dealing with client fraud, it will be apparent
on its face. It is so easy to say the words ‘when a lawyer uncovers fraud, she
should be able to disclose it.’ But fraud does not appear that way save in the
rarest of cases.”193
VII. ANALYSIS
An evaluation of the need for a federal rule regulating attorney conduct
implicates a balancing test of competing and often conflicting interests. Those
two interests are the lawyer’s duty to the client and the need to protect the
investing public from unscrupulous corporate behavior. Resolution of this
conflict requires two basic considerations.
The first issue requires
consideration of what the proper role of the corporate attorney is. Should
attorneys, representing a corporate client, be subject to the same standards and
duties regarding client confidentiality as lawyers acting in more of an
adversary role?194 The second issue requires a determination of who should be
responsible for regulating attorney conduct. Should the bar associations of the
individual states be responsible for regulating members’ conduct and
disciplining them if they fail to act appropriately, or should the SEC, the
federal agency charged with protecting the investing public, have a say in the
regulation of attorney conduct when those attorneys are appearing and
practicing before the Commission? Legal scholars, law practitioners, and
regulators have heatedly debated these questions and have presented powerful
arguments for both sides.195

189. Boxer, supra note 187 (quoting Lawrence J. Fox).
190. FOX, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Some legal scholars have argued that securities lawyers are in “professional jeopardy”
because of attempts by the SEC to alter their duties to their clients, thereby hampering their
ability to “zealously represent” the client. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 21.
195. See supra Part VI for some of the central arguments in favor of and in opposition to a
federal rule regulating attorney conduct.
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The classic role of the attorney as an advocate of the client is a
longstanding canon of legal ethics. This role has traditionally embraced two
important duties of an attorney: the duty of loyalty to the client, and the duty to
protect and preserve client confidences.196 Without these basic elements of the
attorney-client relationship, clients would not be able to put full trust in their
attorneys, and the attorneys’ ability to best protect the interests of their clients
could be damaged.197 The corporate attorney, however, operates in a
somewhat different role than a criminal attorney or civil litigator. When a
corporate entity acts in a way contrary to the interests of the investing public,
the corporate attorney who knows of such malfeasance and fails to take steps
to prevent or rectify these acts may be taking his or her duties to the client too
far. In these circumstances, the lawyer is not protecting the client’s best
interests in the face of an opposing party in the courtroom. Rather, the
opposition in such cases is the investing public, who, despite the best efforts of
the SEC,198 has no advocate acting on its behalf when dealing with the
corporation. In these circumstances, the role of the attorney is different than it
would be in a litigation or negotiation setting. The corporate attorney must be
aware of an obligation to the public at large, as well as to his or her client.
Recently, it has become increasingly clear that the existing system of
checks on corporate America has failed to provide adequate safeguards to
investors.199 Lawyers can no longer be viewed merely as tools of their
corporate clients. Instead, they must also be aware of a duty to protect
investors from their clients’ wrongful acts. Clearly, such conflicting roles of
advocate and gatekeeper may often be difficult to reconcile. Because these
lawyers are in the unique position of having to ensure their clients’ compliance
with federal securities laws, they must continually balance the competing
interests of their clients and the investing public, who the federal securities
laws are meant to protect. It is for this reason that a clear set of standards of
behavior are needed to guide corporate attorneys in striking a balance between
their conflicting duties. Furthermore, federal, as opposed to state, regulation is
desirable for two reasons. First, it allows for uniformity in an area of law
where state ethical standards have varied significantly.200 This is especially
desirable in light of the national and sometimes international operations of so
196. John W. Amberg & Jon L. Rewinski, Issues of Loyalty and Confidentiality Continue to
Dominate Developments in Legal Ethics, 26 L.A. LAW. 31, 32 (2003).
197. Id. at 34.
198. Despite the important task faced by the Commission, the agency has only limited
resources and a “meager” staff with which to achieve these lofty objectives. FREEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 21.
199. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
200. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59. This letter was written in response to the
SEC release seeking comments on proposed Rule 205.
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many public companies, as well as the large scale of many of the law firms
which represent these corporate clients.201 Second, because such standards
would ultimately serve the purpose of promoting greater compliance with
federal securities laws, it seems logical that a set of federal standards would be
most appropriate.
Rule 205 provides corporate attorneys with much needed guidance
regarding how to behave when faced with evidence of fraudulent behavior by
the corporate client. As discussed above, under the current scheme of state
ethical rules and corporate securities laws, attorneys may have had little
helpful guidance as to appropriate conduct when dealing with client fraud prior
to SEC Rule 205.202 Furthermore, Rule 205 will not only benefit corporate
attorneys, it should also impact positively upon capital markets because it
allows investors to have greater confidence that corporate fraud will be less
likely to be overlooked by corporate attorneys.203 The rule will provide much
needed uniformity among jurisdictions regarding ethical rules for corporate
attorneys.204 Moreover, because Rule 205 introduces the threat of disclosure,
corporate attorneys may be able to more successfully dissuade clients from
continuing or failing to rectify the results of fraudulent conduct.205
While many authorities, especially many practicing attorneys, argue that
allowing disclosure of client confidences in the face of fraudulent conduct will
have a “chilling effect” on clients’ willingness to communicate with attorneys
and seek legal counsel,206 this argument may be more theoretical than
practical.207 Corporate actors still have incentives to seek the advice of
attorneys.208 Furthermore, despite the above discussed policy rationales for
201. Id.
202. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107.
203. Id. at 139. Nicholson argued for the need for the ABA to amend Model Rule 1.6,
however, the same rationale lends support to the argument favoring federal standards of behavior
for attorneys, as provided by SEC Rule 205.
204. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
205. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139; William H. Simon, Perspective: Managerial
Confidentiality Is Overrated, N.Y. LAW J., Oct. 2, 2003, at 2.
206. Schaller, supra note 186; Andersen, supra note 186, at 22.
207. Simon, supra note 205.
208. Letter from Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, et al.,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lawprofs040703.htm. This letter was sent in response
to the January 29, 2003 SEC release seeking commentary on final and proposed Rule 205. The
letter states:
Corporate clients (through their agents) confide in corporate lawyers (to the extent they
do, which is now imperfect and always will be) because corporations need legal advice.
Period. There is no evidence whatsoever that corporate clients have avoided lawyers in
those few states that now require disclosure of client illegality or those states that permit
such disclosure.
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confidentiality,209 the policy supporting disclosure by corporate attorneys
where their corporate client is engaging in violations of securities laws should
ultimately be deemed to outweigh any conflicting considerations. When
corporate attorneys are forced to balance the interests of their clients against
the interests of the investing public, the need to protect the public from fraud
and misinformation must outweigh the duty to protect the clients’ confidences.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Corporate attorneys occupy a unique role in the legal system. Unlike most
lawyers, who must concern themselves only with the interests of their clients,
corporate attorneys must recognize and take responsibility for their duty to the
investing public to act as a corporate gatekeeper. Recent scandals in corporate
America have prompted many to ask what went wrong.210 While corporate
officers, boards of directors, and auditors are often looked to as the source of
corporate malfeasance, the role of lawyers in these debacles has not escaped
scrutiny.211 Therefore, when Congress decided to take action by passing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a provision directed toward regulating the
conduct of corporate attorneys was included.212 Corresponding SEC Rule 205
has prompted substantial debate and controversy in the legal community.
Many have opposed the rule as an improper infringement upon the territory of
the state bar associations in regulating attorney conduct. Others have claimed
Id. See also Simon, supra note 205. Simon states:
[A]gents continue to seek legal advice, in part because there are compensating
inducements to do so, and risks of not doing so. Failing to seek legal advice can forfeit
the protections of the “business judgment” rule for civil liability, and the benefits of the
“advice of counsel” defense for criminal liability. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, by increasing
the threat of both kinds of liability, will probably have a far greater effect in encouraging
legal consultation than any attorney-disclosure duty could have in reducing it.
Id. In his article, Simon was specifically addressing the potential effects of the “noisy
withdrawal” provision still under consideration by the SEC, as opposed to the “permissive
disclosure” standard which the current version of Rule 205 imposes.
209. See supra Part VI.B.
210. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
211. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards). In
introducing section 307 as a floor amendment, Senator Edwards stated:
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone . . . . If executives
and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that
the lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs. For the sake of investors
and regular employees, ordinary shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the
executives and the accountants do what they are responsible for doing, but also that the
lawyers do what they are responsible for doing as members of the bar and as citizens of
the country.
Id.
212. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
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that the rule violates the ethical duty of confidentiality by allowing for
permissive disclosure of client confidences in certain circumstances. Some
legal professionals, such as those in Washington and California, have expressly
challenged the Rule.
Despite whatever validity these arguments may or may not have, Rule 205
serves important policy rationales that are too often ignored or overlooked by
the legal community. Corporate attorneys must take responsibility for their
duty to the public. When the corporate client misbehaves, attorneys must not
look the other way and hope for the best. Rule 205 will help to ensure that
these lawyers start taking responsibility and thereby promote full disclosure
and protect the greater public interest against corporate wrongdoings.
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